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Essays
Is There An Overbreadth Doctrine?
LAWRENCE A. ALEXANDER*
Courts and commentators frequently refer to a doctrine called 'first
amendment overbreadth." Yet, there is very little agreement on what the
doctrine means and what justifies its adoption. In the article the author
discusses various ways a statute can be overbroad and why overbreadth
might be of concern. He then proposes a formulation of the first amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine that responds to that concern.
INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court opinions and reams of scholarly commentary pro-
claim the existence of a doctrine called "first amendment over-
breadth."' All who proclaim its existence seem to agree on at least
three of its features:2
(1) The doctrine is unique to the free speech area; (2) the doctrine, when
properly invoked, results in the invalidation of entire statutes and adminis-
trative rules, or at least substantial portions of them, not just invalidation of
particular unconstitutional applications of the statutes and rules; and (3)
the doctrine permits anyone whose conduct falls within the statute or rule,
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A. 1965, Williams
College; LL.B. 1968, Yale University.
1. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J.
YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 867-71 (2d ed. 1983); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 710-18 (1978); Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger Court and the First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1031 (1983); Note, The First
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
2. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 710-16.
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or at least that portion that will be invalidated under (2), to invoke the
doctrine, even though their conduct is in some sense not constitutionally
privileged with respect to the statute or rule.
There have been some attempts to explain and justify the over-
breadth doctrine,3 as well as some attempts to discredit it.4 The most
notable fact about the doctrine, however, is that what it is and what
justifies it remain the subjects of controversy and confusion.
The controversy and confusion surrounding overbreadth are un-
derstandable. There are actually three possible renditions of the
overbreadth doctrine. One is far too sweeping to be acceptable, and
in any event has not been accepted by the Supreme Court. One is so
unexceptional and commonplace that it cannot be deemed a special
doctrine, and surely not a first amendment doctrine. Finally, one
holds out some prospect for a special first amendment doctrine, but
it is subject to some serious objections.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
Before discussing the three possible renditions of overbreadth, I
want to lay some groundwork by considering the ordinary relation
between the sweep of a statute and its constitutionality. Every stat-
ute is of course limited by the Constitution. Therefore, every statute
can be viewed as though it included not only its express language,
but also all of the constitutional doctrines that act as limitations on
statutes.
Sometimes, of course, constitutional limitations will be surplusage
because the statute, literally construed, does not have any applica-
tions that violate the Constitution. Other times, however, a literal
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 1; Redish, supra note I; Note, supra note I.
Martin Redish's recent exploration of first amendment overbreadth merits special com-
ment at this point because I shall not be dealing with Redish's analysis at any point in
the text, despite Redish's stature as a first amendment theorist. My reason for omitting
discussion of Redish is simple: Redish is labeling as "overbreadth" a defect in laws that
is wholly different from the defects that make first amendment overbreadth a unique
doctrine. Basically, Redish interprets overbreadth as the defect of not pursuing the least
restrictive alternative, with the result that a law with such a defect impinges more on
activities of first amendment concern than is necessary to accomplish the state's legiti-
mate objectives. Redish, supra note I, at 1035-37. The question of overbreadth is, for
Redish, whether the state's justification for proscribing or burdening certain otherwise
first-amendment-protected conduct is a sufficient justification. If not, the law is invalid.
For me, overbreadth analysis does not deal with the state's substantive interests in the
scope of its laws, but with the state's drafting interests. For me, the overbreadth question
is the question of when a law that concededly has unconstitutional (hence, unjustifiable)
applications (if applied according to its terms) may be left on the books and validly
applied to less constitutionally-favored conduct. The relevant state interests for over-
breadth are those interests that relate to drafting laws in certain terms rather than
others, not the interests that might support the constitutionality of all applications of
those laws according to the terms chosen. Redish's analysis concerns the latter kinds of
state interests; mine concerns the former kinds of state interests.
4. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 S. CT. REv. I.
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construction of a statute will violate the Constitution in some imagi-
nable cases.
For example, suppose California's trespass statute expressly refers
only to entering onto another's property without the latter's consent.
Nonetheless, we know that California's trespass statute cannot con-
stitutionally be applied, though it is literally applicable, to a trespass
that occurs in Arizona, 5 or to a trespass by a leafletting Jehovah's
Witness on the streets of a company town.8
What follows from this fact? Nothing of any significance. Of
course, if California were to apply its trespass law to the Arizona
trespass or the company town trespass, the courts would strike down
those applications. We might explain the courts' actions by invoking
the Constitution as an external limit on the application of laws. Al-
ternatively, we might explain the courts' actions by indulging the
fiction that the legislature always intends to incorporate the Consti-
tution into each of its laws. In either case, the result is the same:
applications of the law that violate constitutional limits are struck
down.
But more importantly, the trespass law remains on the books and
validly applicable in all those situations where its application would
not violate the Constitution. For the person subject to the law, there-
fore, it is as though a statute that reads "do not do x" actually
means "do not do x, except when the Constitution prevents the legis-
lature from prohibiting x."
DEFINING OVERBREADTH
This is the ordinary relation between the sweep of a statute and its
constitutionality. Now, what about first amendment overbreadth?
What is it, and what justifies it?
Facial Overbreadth
The first possibility is that first amendment overbreadth is an ex-
ception to the ordinary situation outlined above for cases where stat-
utes applied according to their terms violate constitutional protec-
tions of free speech in some circumstances. Thus, where the literal
application of the statute conflicts with the statute construed as lim-
ited by free speech doctrines, the statute is invalid in toto and cannot
5. States have no constitutionally valid penal authority over acts committed in
other states.
6. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
be applied to any conduct. The rationale for total invalidation of
such a statute might be that a person cannot be presumed to have
notice of constitutional doctrines related to speech and thus will be
"chilled" - deterred from privileged speech - by an overbroad
statute.
Such an overbreadth doctrine would be a suffocating restraint on
legislation. If any conceivable literal application of the statute would
violate a first amendment doctrine, the entire statute would be void.
Ordinary trespass statutes would be void7 So would laws that pro-
hibit defamation without reference to lines drawn by the Supreme
Court to mark off areas of first amendment privilege." Because the
first amendment has implications for almost any type of statute, and
because much of first amendment doctrine is quite fact-sensitive, the
overbreadth doctrine considered here would put practically all legis-
lation at risk.
Of course, one escape from this dilemma would be for the legisla-
ture to append to each and every statute a proviso that the statute
should be construed as limited by the first amendment. If such a
proviso is an effective remedy for overbreadth, then the overbreadth
doctrine really has no bite at all. No legislature would lbver omit
such a proviso if it considered it; because the Constitution necessa-
rily limits the application of any statute, adding the proviso is
costless as far as the legislature is concerned.
Therefore, the overbreadth doctrine here considered has either too
much or too little bite. In any event, the Supreme Court surely does
not subscribe to it. The Court has not declared statutes like the ordi-
nary trespass statute invalid merely because they have applications
that run afoul of the first amendment. Nor has it invalidated statutes
that regulate the content of speech, such as the defamation laws,
merely because applied literally, they violate the first amendment in
a range of cases. The defamation cases, which struck down applica-
tions of defamation laws, but not the laws themselves, are also
counter-examples to limitations of the overbreadth doctrine to laws
that regulate content, or that are "substantially overbroad." Defa-
mation laws possess both attributes.9
A Constitutionally Illegitimate Predicate for Governmental
Regulation
A second possible rendition of first amendment overbreadth is sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's labeling such laws as those
7. See id.
8. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967).
9. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 714-15.
[VOL. 22: 541. 1985) Overbreadth Doctrine
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
proscribing picketing void for overbreadth. 10 Here it is necessary to
digress a moment and discuss what makes conduct constitutionally
privileged.
The Constitution's individual rights provisions by and large do not
protect specific conduct per se. The free exercise clause may be the
exception. Within freedom of speech, constitutional limits on time,
place, and manner restrictions, if such limits exist, would also be
exceptions. Rather, the Constitution ordinarily limits the types of
reasons that government may act upon in regulating conduct. For
instance, "criticizing the government" is not protected conduct
viewed in isolation from the various ways government might attempt
to regulate "criticizing the government." "Criticizing the govern-
ment" may be validly - constitutionally - regulated if the criti-
cism is broadcast from a soundtruck at night, and the regulation
proscribes the use of soundtrucks at night. "Criticizing the govern-
ment" may be validly regulated if the criticism takes place on pri-
vate property without the owner's consent, and the regulation pros-
cribes trespass. But "criticizing the government" is not validly
regulated if the regulation proscribes, or was motivated by a desire
to proscribe, "criticizing the government."
Now when a statute contains a constitutionally illegitimate predi-
cate of governmental action, the statute is void and cannot be ap-
plied. If for instance a statute proscribes "picketing," "mutilating
the flag," or "demonstrations by blacks," the statute cannot be ap-
plied as is, nor can it be applied even if narrowed to "violent picket-
ing," "burning the flag in public," ' or "disruptive demonstrations by
blacks." The narrowed statute still contains the illegitimate predi-
cate for governmental action.
Put differently, while violent picketing, burning the flag in public,
and disruptive demonstrations by blacks are all activities that can be
validly proscribed under some statutes - for example, statutes pro-
scribing violence, public burnings, and disruptive demonstrations -
violent picketing, burning of the flag, and disruptive demonstrations
by blacks do not mark off legitimately regulatable subcategories of
legitimately regulatable activity. They are therefore underinclusive
with respect to legitimately regulatable activity. The government
may ban all violence, but not just violence associated with picketing.
The government may ban all public burnings, but not just those that
involve the flag. And so forth.
10. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
11. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
When a statute contains a constitutionally illegitimate predicate
for governmental regulation, the statute is "unconstitutionally over-
broad" in the sense that the statute is totally void and cannot be
saved by narrowing. It has no range of constitutional applications.
This version of overbreadth is clearly not unique to the first
amendment. Indeed, it is commonplace throughout the domain of
constitutional liberties, wherever the meaning of those liberties pri-
marily consists in limits on the reasons government may act upon in
regulating.
Moreover, it is misleading to label the doctrine one of overbreadth,
since the overbreadth metaphor suggests the statute has a legitimate
range of applications but has just exceeded that range. On this ren-
dition of overbreadth, however, the statute has no legitimate range of
application.
The Supreme Court recently has expressed recognition that a stat-
ute void in toto because of a constitutionally illegitimate predicate
for regulation is not really "overbroad." In Secretary of State v. Jo-
seph H. Munson Company,'2 the issue was whether a Maryland
statute that banned charitable solicitation by organizations with high
fundraising costs violated the first (fourteenth) amendment. In hold-
ing that the statute was void on its face, the majority, responding to
the argument that the statute was not "substantially overbroad" and
thus should be struck down only as applied,' 3 distinguished the Ma-
ryland statute from those that had survived facial attacks because
they were not substantially overbroad:
Here there is no core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable
conduct that the statute prohibits. While there no doubt are organizations
that have high fundraising costs not due to protected First Amendment ac-
tivity and that, therefore, should not be heard to complain that their activi-
ties are prohibited, this statute cannot distinguish those organizations from
charities that have high costs due to protected First Amendment activities.
The flaw in the statute is not simply that it includes within its sweep some
impermissible applications, but that in all its applications, it operates on a
fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation costs are an accurate
measure of fraud. That the statute in some of its applications actually pre-
vents the misdirection of funds from the organization's purported charitable
goal is little more than fortuitous. It is equally likely that the statute will
restrict First Amendment activity that results in high costs but is itself a
part of the charity's goal or that is simply attributable to the fact that the
charity's cause proves to be unpopular. On the other hand, if an organiza-
tion indulges in fraud, there is nothing in the percentage limitation that
prevents it from misdirecting funds. In either event, the percentage limita-
tion, though restricting solicitation costs, will have done nothing to prevent
fraud.
Where, as here, a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First
Amendment activity, and where the defect in the statute is that the means
chosen to accomplish the State's objectives are too imprecise, so that in all
12. 104 S. Ct. 2839 (1984).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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its applications the statute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free
speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack.14
In a footnote, the Court went on to say that the dissent's efforts to
limit the scope of the statute were misguided:
The dissenters appear to overlook the fact that "overbreadth" is not used
only to describe the doctrine that allows a litigant whose own conduct is
unprotected to assert the rights of third parties to challenge a statute, even
though "as applied" to him the statute would be constitutional .... "Over-
breadth" has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all
its applications directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and
does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest....
It was on the basis of the latter failing that the Court in Schaumburg [Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environment. 444 U.S. 620
(1980)] struck down the Village ordinance as unconstitutional. Whether
that challenge should be called "overbreadth" or simply a "facial" chal-
lenge, the point is that there is no reason to limit challenges to case-by-case
"as applied" challenges when the statute on its face and therefore in all its
applications falls short of constitutional demands. The dissenters' efforts to
chip away at the possibly impermissible applications of the statute do noth-
ing to address the failing that the Schaumburg Court found dispositive -
that a percentage limitation on fundraising unnecessarily restricts protected
First Amendment activity. 5
It is significant that the dissent, although it quarreled, probably jus-
tifiably, with the majority's contention that the costs of fundraising
were a constitutionally illegitimate predicate for regulation, did not
dispute the majority's characterization of statutes with such illegiti-
mate predicates as facially void.
The Harvard Rendition
The final rendition of first amendment overbreadth is the Harvard
Note16 - Larry Tribe17 ("Harvard") rendition: the first amendment's
substantive doctrines as unconstitutionally vague implied limits on
statutory language. According to the Harvard rendition of over-
breadth, the Supreme Court has come up with two types of doctrines
in the area of free speech. One type of doctrine, exemplified by the
New York Times v. Sullivan test for permissible regulation of defa-
mation - knowledge of falsity or knowing disregard of truth or fal-
sity - lends itself to a relatively clear, bright line test for constitu-
tionality. If we take a law that proscribes defamation and apply it
according to its terms, some of the applications - those that violate
14. 104 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
15. Id. at 2852 n.13.
16. See Note, supra note 1.
17. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1.
the Sullivan test - will be unconstitutional. If we graft the Sullivan
test onto the law, so that we have a law that proscribes defamation,
except where the Sullivan test is violated, we have a statute that is
both narrowed to only constitutional applications and is clear.
Other first amendment doctrines do not translate into clear,
bright-line tests. If those doctrines are grafted onto laws that, when
applied literally, have some unconstitutional applications, they suc-
ceed in narrowing the laws only by introducing a degree of vague-
ness that, because it might deter some constitutionally protected
speech, is unconstitutional itself. In other words, the Supreme
Court's own first amendment tests, or at least some of them, if
tacked onto statutes as limitations, render the statutes unconstitu-
tionally vague.
On the Harvard rendition of overbreadth, where - and only
where - a statute has some (literal) applications that violate the
first amendment, and the test for those violations is vague,the statute
is unconstitutionally overbroad and must be narrowed (without ren-
dering it overly vague).
The Harvard rendition of overbreadth has been forcefully attacked
by Henry Monaghan on three grounds: (1) the Harvard rendition
results in a difference in treatment of statutes that are functionally
equivalent; (2) the Harvard rendition represents a disguised attack
on some of the Supreme Court's determinations of what speech is
constitutionally protected; and (3) the Harvard rendition rests on an
illusory distinction between fact-sensitive and non-fact-sensitive rules
of constitutional privilege. 18
Monaghan voices his first criticism in the following passage:
Sophisticated overbreadth theory is not empty. Emphasizing "determina-
tive," advocates of this form of overbreadth methodology do not equate "de-
terminative rules of privilege" with the judicially established categories de-
lineating unprotected speech. Rather, effort is made to distinguish among
the various unprotected categories.
The unprotected categories are, ex hypothesi, not unconstitutionally
vague. Nevertheless, overbreadth theorists maintain that some of these cate-
gories involve a constellation of fact-dependent variables too numerous in
range and too unpredictable in application to be regarded as sufficiently
determinative for the purpose of slicing a statute to acceptable constitu-
tional limits. Professor Tribe, for example, rejects the "fighting words" ex-
ception as a satisfactory constraining limitation; it is, he says, not "precise
and focused enough to give advance warning of the exact reach of the stat-
ute punishing offensive speech, since decisions under the standard turn on
the facts particular to the speaker, the audience, and their interaction." The
result is curious: A statute prohibiting "fighting words" in the terms defined
by the Supreme Court could be validly applied to any litigant, while a stat-
ute prohibiting some form of "offensive speech" but readily constrained by
a court to reach identically defined "fighting words" could not be so ap-
plied, even prospectively. 9
18. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 19-21.
19. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
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Monaghan's first criticism appears to rest on a mistaken assump-
tion, namely, that a statute that tracks the language of a constitu-
tional test laid down by the Supreme Court (one that bans, say,
"fighting words") is, on the Harvard rendition, okay, whereas a stat-
ute that is merely limited by such a test may not be. If the assump-
tion were correct, the result would surely be anomalous, as
Monaghan suggests. As I read the Harvard rendition, however, it
treats overbroad statutes limited by vague constitutional tests and
statutes stated in terms of those tests as on a par in terms of validity.
The latter, while not technically "overbroad," are at least unconsti-
tutionally vague."
Monaghan's second criticism rejects the sharp distinction between
rules of constitutional privilege on which the Harvard rendition
relies:
Attempts to draw lines between acceptable and unacceptable
20. Cf. California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.7 (West Supp. 1985) (proscribing
acts described in the precise terms of the constitutional test for illegal advocacy laid
down in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
Martin Redish makes the same assumption as Monaghan on this point, namely, that a
law drafted in the language of a Supreme Court first amendment test would not be con-
stitutionally infirm. Redish, supra note 1, at 1054-56. His reason is that the legislature, if
it wishes to reach all uses of, say, "fighting words" or advocacy of criminal conduct that
is unprivileged, can only do so by tracking the language of the Supreme Court tests. The
point is well-taken, but it proves too much. If accepted it would render the overbreadth
doctrine a nullity, since the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrines are legally implied
parts of all laws in the sense that no law may be applied inconsistently with those doc-
trines. Moreover, Redish admits that overbreadth cannot be avoided by reading the Con-
stitution into every law, though he inexplicably distinguishes doing so from appending
more specific constitutional formulas to laws. Id. at 1056. I see no difference.
The source of Redish's ambivalence toward the inclusion of the Constitution as part of
every law is perhaps the case he mentions in that connection, namely, Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972). The Supreme Court in Gooding struck down as overbroad a Geor-
gia law punishing offensive speech, implying that it would not have done so had the
Georgia courts limited the law to "fighting words" as defined in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Redish accepts the implication and concludes that a
law drafted in terms of Supreme Court speech tests will be upheld, no matter how fact-
sensitive and thus incapable of mechanical application. Redish, supra note 1 at 1054-55.
But the Court's implication in Gooding is nonsensical because the Georgia law could not
validly be applied except in accordance with Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky is read into every
law, because the Constitution is read into every law. If we assume that the Georgia
courts in applying Georgia's laws will obey the Constitution as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, then the fact that Chaplinsky had not officially been declared a limit on
those laws by the Georgia courts is irrelevant. All it demonstrates is that the Georgia
courts had not considered or correctly interpreted the constitutional requirements in pre-
vious decisions.
But what is the solution to the drafting problem Redish identifies? I believe it lies in
recognizing that the harm of chilling effect of vague language, either statutory or consti-
tutional, can sometimes be outweighed by the state interest in reaching all unprotected
conduct, though sometimes it may not be. See infra text accompanying notes 30-34.
constitutional privileges for purposes of allowing narrowing statutory con-
structions are fundamentally flawed. The defect inheres in the impossibility
of drawing principled distinctions, for these purposes, among the various
rules of First Amendment privilege. The entire effort posits a sharp contrast
between two types of privilege rules: (a) privilege rules which are subject-
matter specific and which "elevate a few factors to per se status," - for
example, the actual malice rule of the defamation cases and the obscenity
criteria; and (b) other First Amendment privilege standards which assert-
edly focus in an ad hoc manner on a combination of a much larger set of
variables, some outside the actor's control - for example, the "fighting
words" and Brandenburg incitement standards which, inter alia, focus "on
the propensity of defined conduct to bring about concrete harms. . ....
This distinction between the two types of privileges seems to me to rest, in
part, on a distortion of the substantive content of the "acceptable" privi-
leges, and, in part, on a thinly disguised rejection of the constitutional ade-
quacy of the disfavored privileges.
21
Monaghan's second criticism is essentially an ad hominem,
namely, that the distinction between those constitutional tests ac-
ceptable for limiting overbroad statutes and those unacceptable ap-
pears to rest more on the constitutional merits of the tests than, as
the Harvard rendition claims, on their vague, fact-sensitive versus
clear, per se rule qualities.
Taking the Harvard rendition at its word, however, brings us to
Monaghan's third criticism, namely, that no first amendment privi-
lege rule can escape being fact-sensitive:
Most important, however, the asserted distinction between the two types of
privilege rules cannot bear the weight placed on it. Admitting that certain
kinds of harm justify some content-based regulation, the categorization ap-
proach seeks to identify those harms "at wholesale in advance, outside the
context of specific cases." -This avoids the danger of distortion brought
about by the pull of specific facts and particular litigants. But the catego-
ries having been established, ex ante, the problem of application occurs. At
that stage, no privilege rule is or can be completely independent of the un-
derlying factual circumstances to which it is applied, nor is there any reason
to suppose that any adjudication under one set of privilege rules is materi-
ally more immune from the risk of speech-punishing mistake than under
other privilege rules. The system of privilege rules, real or imagined, varies
only in degree of adjudicative predictability. No subset of these rules can be
identified, ex ante, for purposes of distinguishing in a principled way be-
tween those privilege rules which can tolerably be utilized for statute nar-
rowing and those which cannot. Once state court power to apply separabil-
ity doctrine to statutes which touch expression is acknowledged in any form,
no coherent limitation on that power can be developed.
22
Here again, Monaghan seems to have missed the mark. If the per
se lines drawn by the "acceptable" (for limiting overbroad statues)
first amendment tests really do mark the boundary of constitutional
freedom of speech - or if, as is more likely, they are deliberately
tailored by the Supreme Court to protect an area broader than is in
fact constitutionally valued23 - there really is no need to attend to
21. Monaghan, supra note 4, at 19-20 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
23. See Bevier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
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the facts in any case beyond those facts identified as relevant by the
first amendment tests. 24
One reason why Monaghan's attack on the Harvard rendition of
overbreadth fails perhaps is that Monaghan's paradigm of an over-
broad statute is a statute that contains a constitutionally illegitimate
predicate of governmental action, the second possible meaning of
overbreadth that I discussed.25 Such a statute, as I pointed out, has
no legitimate range of applications. The Harvard rendition assumes
that there are statutes whose terms suggest proper predicates of gov-
ernmental action but whose sweep is merely too broad. And, indeed,
there are such statutes. A law proscribing all defamation is based on
a legitimate interest in protecting reputations, one that is merely out-
weighed by speech concerns in a range of cases. A narrowed defama-
tion law is not underinclusive with respect to its legitimate govern-
mental objectives in the way a narrowed flag mutilation law ("flag
burning in public") or a narrowed anti-picketing law ("violent pick-
eting") is with respect to any legitimate predicate (the danger of fire
or violence).
There are problems with the Harvard rendition of overbreadth,
however, even if not the problems Monaghan identifies. The most
fundamental problem is that the doctrine appears to put at risk too
many statutes that we intuitively want upheld. For example, the line
marking off those applications of ordinary trespass laws that are con-
stitutional from those that violate the first amendment is certainly
vague in the sense relevant to the Harvard rendition of overbreadth.
Yet, the Supreme Court is not about to void ordinary trespass laws
on overbreadth grounds, nor would we want it to do so.
The Harvard rendition invokes a limiting doctrine at this point.
Overbreadth must be "substantial. ' 26 Any statute can have a small
"chilling effect" on speech activities, no matter how carefully drawn.
Only those statutes that threaten to deter a substantial amount of
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 322-31 (1978); Schauer, Fear,
Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REV. 685
(1978).
24. Of course, one can legitimately argue that the Supreme Court has never fash-
ioned a rule of constitutional privilege in the first amendment that is so bright-line that it
can be safely used as limiting language of an otherwise overbroad law. Tribe (but not the
Harvard Note) assumes that New York Times v. Sullivan states such a rule - see L.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 714-15; Note, supra note 1, at 884-87 - but that is questionable
given the extremely fact-sensitive nature of the inquiry into the plaintiff's status as a
public figure. See J. NOWAK, et al, supra note 1, at 948-52.
25. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 11-12.
26. See L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 712-13; Note, supra note 1, at 859.
protected speech activity should be invalidated for overbreadth.
This limitation, which the Supreme Court has adopted,27 does not
clearly save trespass laws. There may be many instances of first-
amendment-protected trespassing that are deterred by ordinary tres-
pass laws plus the lack of per se rule of first amendment privilege.
A second possible limitation on overbreadth is one invoked by the
Supreme Court and by commentators: the overbroad statute must be
one that deals primarily with expressive activities.2 8 Thus, a statute
that proscribes offensive speech is subject to overbreadth analysis,
whereas a trespass statute, because it regulates activity that is pri-
marily non-expressive,2 9 is not subject to overbreadth analysis.
There are two problems with this limitation. First, some statutes
that are substantially overbroad and limited by a fact-sensitive con-
stitutional test, and yet are not obviously deserving of the meat-axe
of overbreadth invalidation, do regulate activity that is primarily ex-
pressive. Laws dealing with revelations of sensitive government infor-
mation, or laws dealing with insubordination by government employ-
ees, might be examples.
Second, limiting overbreadth analysis to laws that primarily regu-
late expression is either duplicative of the "substantiality" limitation
or else is essentially ad hoc. If a law is substantially overbroad and
thus potentially chills protected speech, why should it matter that
most of those regulated will not be engaged in speech?
A PROPOSAL
I suggest reformulating the overbreadth doctrine to make clear
why an ordinary trespass law is not a problem. The concern of the
overbreadth doctrine is chilling effect on protected activities. But the
harm of chilling effect can be outweighed by government's interests
in formulating laws in ways that create a chilling effect. For exam-
ple, "conduct unbecoming an officer" is a phrase sufficiently vague to
cover and deter speech.30 And the constitutional test for when the
military may penalize its officers' speech is undoubtedly not a bright-
line test. But the government's (military's) interest in deterring all
conduct on the unprotected side of that line may justify a law that
chills protected speech, even though by hypothesis that speech may
27. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-74 (1982); Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 59-61 (1976); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
615-16 (1973).
28. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614-17 (1973); J. NoWAK, et
al, supra note 1, at 870-71; Note, supra note 1, at 918-21. But see Redish, supra note 1,
at 1058-64.
29. But see Alexander & Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle,
78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1319 (1983).
30. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-61 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 160-64 (1974).
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not be directly proscribed.
Thus, since the focus of the overbreadth doctrine is unjustified
chilling effect on protected speech, I suggest the following (non-
bright-line) formulation of that doctrine:
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if (1) an ordinary person to whom
the law will be applied, aware of the language of the law and of the rele-
vant constitutional tests,31 and contemplating engaging in constitutionally
protected expression, is likely erroneously to believe (in a significant num-
ber of cases)3 2 that if he engages in that expression, the government will
31. One might attack both my formulation and the Harvard rendition of over-
breadth on the ground that both approaches employ a contrary-to-fact presumption of
knowledge of Supreme Court constitutional doctrine. If one is concerned with the actual
chilling effect of statutes, then one must take people as they are; and people typically are
ignorant of the Supreme Court's elaboration of the first amendment.
A limited response to this attack might be that many and perhaps most potential viola-
tors of overbroad statutes seek legal advice before taking action, and lawyers, if not their
clients, should be presumed to know Supreme Court doctrine.
A more general response is just to cite to the basic principles of Anglo-American juris-
prudence, principles that presume not only knowledge of statutory law, but knowledge of
decisional law - both common law and constitutional - as well. See J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 388-89 (2d ed. 1960); Evans v. United States, 349 F.2d
653 (5th Cir. 1965); Jenkins v. State, 23 Md. 529, 194 A.2d 618 (1963). There are some
recognized exceptions to the presumption - see J. HALL, supra, at 389-92; W. LAFAVE
& A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 365 (1972); Holdridge v. United States,
282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) - but these
exceptions do not negate the presumption of knowledge of Supreme Court decisions.
Recently, Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has taken a fresh look at the legal system's pos-
ture towards both ignorance of the law and vagueness of the law through the conceptual
prism of "acoustic separation." Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On
Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Acoustic separa-
tion refers to the phenomenon of having legal norms addressed to officials ("decisional
rules") that are different from those addressed to primary actors ("conduct rules") with
respect to the same conduct. If Supreme Court first amendment doctrine is not in fact
accessible to those persons the chilling effect on whom is the concern of overbreadth
analysis, then the legal presumption of knowledge of Supreme Court doctrine combined
with literally overbroad status will chill expression even if Supreme Court doctrine is
stated in the form of clear, per se rules. An overbroad statute functions like a vague
statute if the person contemplating violating it knows only that his conduct might be
constitutionally privileged (because he has no meaningful access to Supreme Court deci-
sions). And as Dan-Cohen points out, judicial decisions do not cure the "no notice" vice
of vagueness (as opposed to the "no control of arbitrary decisions" vice) if those decisions
are inaccessible to - acoustically separated from - the persons who are regulated by
the vague statute. Id. at 658-62.
Thus, when it is not realistic to assume that those regulated by overbroad statutes
would have access (through legal advice) to Supreme Court elaborations of the first
amendment, my formulation of the overbreadth doctrine should omit reference to aware-
ness of "relevant constitutional tests," even if those tests meet the Harvard rendition's
criteria for bright-line tests, and despite the normal legal presumption of knowledge of
judicial decisions.
32. Actually, any chilling effect on ordinary persons should be treated as signifi-
cant. The fewer the likely number of persons deterred, the less weighty need be the
government's interest in the choice of language that produces the chilling effect. See
penalize him under the law; and (2) the government's legitimate interests in
the formulation of the law, as opposed to alternative formulations that are
less likely to deter protected expression, are not weighty enough to justify
the heightened probability of such deterrence.
This formulation combines the sins of overbreadth and vagueness
into a general sin of "chilling effect caused by the language of the
law."3' 3 The formulation invites attention to the two material con-
cerns of this area, namely, whether and to what extent protected ex-
pression will be chilled by the words of the law, and whether such
chilling effect is a fair price to pay for the interests served by those
words as opposed to other words. A focus on protected expression
also requires an assessment of whether a vague, fact-sensitive consti-
tutional test really is designed to distinguish constitutionally valued
expression from other expression, or whether instead it is deliber-
ately drawn wide of the ambit of the constitutionally valued expres-
sion. If the latter, then the fact that expression chilled by the test is
deterred is of no concern unless the expression chilled is also consti-
tutionally valued.34
Redish, supra note 1, at 1065-66.
33. A focus on chilling effect rather than "overbreadth" might have aided the jus-
tices' analysis in the recent case of Regan v. Time, Inc. 104 S. Ct. 3262 (1984). The
issue there was whether sections of the federal anti-counterfeiting laws that prohibit the
photographing or the making of other likenesses of money were void for first amendment
overbreadth. Specifically at issue were sections that permitted the printing or publishing
of such otherwise proscribed illustrations for certain worthy purposes, subject to restric-
tions regarding color and size. Although the justices argued at length over whether limit-
ing the permissive exceptions to publications and to specific purposes rendered the law
unconstitutionally overbroad, no one seemed to notice that eliminating the contested limi-
tations entirely, thus leaving fewer illustrations of money proscribed, and thus completely
elimifiating the overbreadth, would still leave the magazine subject to the statute for
failure to comply with the color and size restrictions.
34. See supra authorities cited in note 23.
